Enhancing Mixup-based Semi-Supervised Learning with Explicit Lipschitz
  Regularization by Gyawali, Prashnna Kumar et al.
1Enhancing Mixup-based Semi-Supervised Learning
with Explicit Lipschitz Regularization
Prashnna Kumar Gyawali, Sandesh Ghimire, and Linwei Wang
pkg2182@rit.edu
Rochester Institute of Technology, NY, USA
Abstract—The success of deep learning relies on the availability
of large-scale annotated data sets, the acquisition of which can
be costly requiring expert domain knowledge. Semi-supervised
learning (SSL) mitigates this challenge by exploiting the behavior
of the neural function on large unlabeled data. The smoothness
of the neural function is a commonly used assumption exploited
in SSL. A successful example is the adoption of mixup strategy
in SSL that enforces the global smoothness of the neural function
by encouraging it to behave linearly when interpolating between
training examples. Despite its empirical success, however, the
theoretical underpinning of how mixup regularizes the neural
function has not been fully understood. In this paper, we offer a
theoretically substantiated proposition that mixup improves the
smoothness of the neural function by bounding the Lipschitz
constant of the gradient function of the neural networks. We
then propose that this can be strengthened by simultaneously
constraining the Lipschitz constant of the neural function itself
through adversarial Lipschitz regularization, encouraging the
neural function to behave linearly while also constraining the
slope of this linear function. On three benchmark data sets
and one real-world biomedical data set, we demonstrate that
this combined regularization results in improved generalization
performance of SSL when learning from a small amount of
labeled data. We further demonstrate the robustness of the
presented method against single-step adversarial attacks. Our
code is available at https://github.com/Prasanna1991/Mixup-LR.
Keywords-Mixup, Smoothness, Lipschitz regularization.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEP Learning has been an increasingly common choiceof data analyses across various domains. They have
achieved strong performance when trained with a large set
of well-annotated data. However, the acquisition of such data
sets is expensive in many domains as the annotation requires
expert knowledge [1]. In comparison, the collection of a large
amount of data without any annotation, i.e., unlabeled data
set, is often less costly. This surplus of unlabeled data can be
exploited to benefit the learning from small labeled data via
semi-supervised learning (SSL).
Formally, in SSL, a data set X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} is
given among which only the first m points are annotated
{y1, ..., ym} ∈ Y , and the remaining points are unlabeled.
While learning the function f : X → Y , SSL will ex-
ploit the hidden relationship within the data to predict the
labels of unlabeled data points. An important assumption
commonly exploited is the smoothness of the neural function
[2]. Generally, this can be loosely categorized into two groups:
Fig. 1: The use of local and global smoothness in the classic
two-moon toy SSL problem.
local smoothness, and global smoothness [2]. As illustrated
in Fig. (1) on a classic two-moon toy problem, local as-
sumption regularizes outputs of nearby points to have the
same label. This is represented by various perturbation-based
methods that constrain the output of the neural function in
the vicinity of available data points [3], [4], which does not
consider the connection between data points. Alternatively,
global assumption regularizes outputs of the points of the same
structure (e.g., any points on a single moon in 1), more fully
utilizing the information in the unlabeled data structures. This
is represented by various graph-based methods [2], [5], where
the similarity of data points is defined by graph and outputs
of neural functions are smoothed for the graph structure.
More recently, the mixup regularizer [6], initially proposed
for supervised learning, has been applied to SSL and demon-
strated state-of-the-art performance [7], [8]. Mixup trains a
deep learning model on linear interpolants of inputs and labels.
It has been considered as regularizing the global smoothness
of the function by filling the void between input samples and,
in specific, has been interpreted to be encouraging a linear
behavior of the underlying neural function when interpolating
between training examples [6]. Despite the empirical success
obtained in many variants of the mixup strategy [9], [10],
however, the theoretical underpinning of its regularization
effect on the the neural function has not been fully understood.
Outside the regime of SSL, different learning theories for
generalization have agreed that regularizing some notion of
smoothness of the hypothesis class of the function helps
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2Fig. 2: Schematic of the mixup-based strategy for learning
function (blue line) with limited labeled data (green dots).
Mixup promotes linearity between the pair of data (black
line) but does not bound the steepness of the slope. We add
Lipschitz regularization to constrain the slope of such function
(green line).
improve generalization [11]. One increasingly popular ap-
proach to regularize the smoothness of the neural function,
or to control the complexity of the function, is in enforcing
Lipschitz continuity of the deep network [12]–[14]. This
interest is particularly noticeable in the generative modeling
community to improve the stability of GANs, where efficiently
constraining the Lipschitz constant of the critic function is
fundamental due to the nature of the underlying optimization
problem (minimization of the Wasserstein distance between
real and generated samples) [13]. The Lipschitz continuity of
a function (see Definition 1 for gradient function) essentially
bounds the rate of changes in the function output as a result of
the change in the input, preventing a function from changing
steeply over its input space. To enforce the Lipschitz continuity
of a neural function (or to constrain the Lipschitz constant of a
neural function), several techniques have been proposed, such
as weight clipping [13], gradient penalty [15], and adversarial
Lipschitz regularization [16]. Beside generative models, the
Lipschitz continuity is also considered in several deep learning
topics, including robust learning [17], deep learning theory
[18] and supervised learning [19]. Despite these extensive
efforts, the effect of Lipschitz continuity for SSL and its
relation with mixup-based regularization have received limited
attention.
In this paper, we first offer a theoretically substantiated
interpretation of the regularization effect of mixup from the
lens of Lipschitz constant. We show that, by promoting lin-
earity, mixup minimizes the Lipschitz constant of the gradient
function of the neural network, thereby enforcing the Lipschitz
smoothness of the neural function (Proposition 1). We then
note that, while this minimizes the rate of change of the
gradient of the neural function, it does not enforce the Lips-
chitz continuity of the neural function itself. Intuitively, this
means that while the mixup encourages the function to behave
linearly when interpolating, it does not bound or constrain the
steepness of the slope of this linear function as illustrated
in Fig. 2. We therefore present a new SSL strategy that
combines mix-up training with Lipshitz regularization (LR)
to simultaneously constraint the Lipschitz constant of both the
neural function (through LR) and its gradient function (through
mixup). This not only encourages the neural function to behave
linearly, but also constrains the slope of this linear function
as illustrated in Fig. 2. We hypothesize that this combined
regularization will further smooth the neural function and
result in improved generalization performance of SSL when
learning from a small amount of labeled data.
We test our hypothesis on three widely considered bench-
mark data sets (CIFAR-10 [20], SVHN [21], and CIFAR-100
[20]) and a real world biomedical data set (Skin Lesion images
[22], [23]). We compare the performance of the presented
method with standard SSL methods, including the state-of-the-
art MixMatch [7], and demonstrate its improvement in gener-
alization across all these datasets. We further investigate the
robustness of the presented method to single-step adversarial
attacks and demonstrate improved robustness.
In summary, the contribution of this work includes:
• We establish the first connection between mixup-based
regularization and the smoothness of the neural function
via Lipschitz smoothness.
• We propose augmenting mixup-based approach with ex-
plicit Lipschitz regularization on the neural function to
improve the generalization of SSL methods.
• We demonstrated improved performance over the state-
of-the-art methods in three benchmark datasets and a real-
world biomedical dataset.
• We demonstrate improved robustness of the presented
method to single-step adversarial attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is generally related to two broad research topics
of deep learning which we discuss separately below.
A. Semi-supervised learning
SSL has been extensively studied in machine learning. In
recent times, with deep learning, SSL has seen tremendous
success. One of the standard approaches of SSL algorithms
is the application of consensus regularization. Toward this,
perturbation around input data points (or its latent space)
[1], [3], [4], [24] have been considered. For instance, in Π-
Model [3], [24], consistency-based regularization is applied on
ensemble predictions obtained via techniques like random data
augmentation, and network dropout. On the other hand, virtual
adversarial training (VAT) [4] maintains similar consistency by
forcing predictions of different adversarially-perturbed inputs
to be the same. However, by considering perturbations around
single data points, these approaches regularize only the local
smoothness of the network function. Furthermore, it has been
argued that such local perturbations would not fully utilize the
information in the unlabeled data structure [5].
For regularizing the global smoothness of the neural func-
tion, mostly graph-based methods have been considered [2],
3[5]. These methods defined the similarity of the data points
on the graph and smoothed outputs of the neural network
for such graph structure. More recently, mixup regularizer [6]
is argued to regularize the global smoothness of the neural
function and, thus, help achieve generalization in SSL [10].
Initially, mixup was proposed for improving generalization in
supervised learning, demonstrating state-of-the-art results in
the corresponding benchmarks [6]. Later, mixup was extended
to the SSL problems, such as MixMatch [7], where a even
larger margin of improvements were obtained across many
datasets. Different variants of mixup have since been presented
in the literature, such as mixing in both data and latent space
for further improving generalization in supervised learning [9]
and SSL [10]. However, despite such empirical success, the
theoretical underpinning of how mixup regularizes the neural
function has not been fully understood.
Motivated by the performance of a mixup-based strategy, in
this paper, we offer a theoretical insight of the regularization
effect of mixup through the lens of Lipschitz constant and,
based on which, identify a complementary improvement to
improve mixup-based SSL.
B. Lipschitz regularization
The Lipschitz constant of the network has been proposed
as a candidate measure for the Rademacher complexity (a
measure of generalization) [18]. Different Lipschitz regulariza-
tions for controlling Lipschitz constant have been considered
in various topics of machine learning. Lipschitz continuity is
commonly considered for robust learning, avoiding adversarial
attacks [17], and stabilization to train generative adversarial
networks [13]. To enforce the Lipschitz constraint, different
implicit approaches like weight clipping [13] and gradient
penalty [15], [25] have been considered. These implicit ap-
proaches approximate the constraint on Lipschitz constant
by, typically, penalizing the norm of the function gradient at
certain input points [15]. An explicit approach to Lipschitz reg-
ularization, on the other hand, attempts to directly encourages
Lipschitz continuity based on its definition, which was argued
to provides more control over the regularization effect [16].
In [16], for instance, this was done by explicitly penalizing
the violation of Lipschitz constraint. Despite these extensive
studies, however, the use of Lipschitz regularization has not
been considered for improving generalization of SSL methods.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first briefly discuss some preliminaries
required for the presented method in Section IV.
A. Preliminary I: Mixup Regularization
Mixup [6] is a data-dependent regularization inspired by
Vicinal Risk Minimization (VRM) principle [26] that en-
courages the model f to behave linearly in-between training
samples. Formally, the mixup produces virtual feature-target
vector:
x˜ = λx1 + (1− λ)x2,
y˜ = λy1 + (1− λ)y2
where (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are two feature-target vectors
drawn randomly from the training data and λ ∼ Beta(α, α) ∈
[0, 1]. This mixup is used to construct a virtual dataset Dv :=
{(x˜i, y˜i)}mi=1 which is then used to train the network function
f by minimizing the loss value:
Lmixup = 1
m
m∑
i
`(f(x˜i, y˜i)) (1)
In between the original feature-target pairs, the loss function
L(f) encourages the network function f to behave linearly:
f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) = λf(x1) + (1− λ)f(x2) (2)
B. Preliminary II: Lipschitz Regularization
A general definition of the smallest Lipschitz constant K of
a function f : X → Y is:
‖f‖K = sup
x1,x2∈X ;x1 6=x2
dY (f(x1), f(x2))
dX(x1, x2)
(3)
where the metric spaces dX and dY are the domain and co-
domain of the function f , respectively. The properties of low
Lipschitz constants for deep networks are explored in [27],
demonstrating that it improves generalization. Recent literature
in stabalizing GAN have proposed different approaches for
Lipschitz regularization. These regularizations can be gener-
ally grouped into an implicit and explicit form of penalization
for violation of Lipschitz constraint. For instance, gradient
penalty [15], an implicit Lipschitz regularization, penalizes the
norm of the gradient as
Ex∼X (‖Oxf(x)‖2 − 1)2 (4)
and Lipschitz penalty [16], [28], an explicit regularization,
penalizes the violation of the Lipschitz constraint as
Ex1,x2∼X (
|f(x1)− f(x2)|
‖x1 − x2‖2
− 1)2 (5)
In both case, the objective is to achieve 1-Lipschitz function
for f , an optimization requirement for Wassterstein-GANs.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We consider a mapping function f : X → Y , approximated
via a deep network. As has been empirically shown, the given
function f achieves better generalization when trained with a
mixup strategy [6]. In IV-A, we first establish the theoretical
connection between mixup and Lipschitz regularization (of
the gradient function of the neural network). With this under-
standing, in IV-B, we propose a complementary improvement
of mixup by explicit Lipschitz regularization of the neural
function via adversarial Lipschitz regularization. Finally, in
IV-C, we integrate these ideas into a new SSL method.
4A. Mixup bounds the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of the
neural function
To understand the role of mixup in regularizing the smooth-
ness of the neural function, we consider the definition of
Lipschitz smoothness.
Definition 1: (Lipschitz Smoothness). A differential func-
tion f : X → Y is Lipschitz smooth with constant L > 0 if
its derivatives are Lipschitz continuous:
‖5f(x1)−5f(x2)‖ ≤ L ‖x1 − x2‖ , ∀x1, x2 ∈ X .
Loosely speaking, when the gradient of a function is Lipschitz
continuous, such function are considered to be smooth.
We now show that mixup regularization is a lower bound of
the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of the neural network.
Proposition 1: Let f be the differential function with a
Lipschitz continuous gradient over Rn with constant L. This
function, f , via mixup regularizer [6], is encouraged toward
convexity such that f(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) = λf(x1) + (1 −
λ)f(x2) with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, f(αx1+(1−α)x2)−(αf(x1)+
(1− α)f(x2)) ≤ α(1−α)L2 ‖x1 − x2‖2.
Proof: With the definition of Lipschitz smoothness, for a
differential function f : X → R, X ⊂ Rn, and a constant L,
we have,
‖5f(x1)−5f(x2)‖ ≤ L ‖x1 − x2‖ , ∀x1, x2 ∈ X . (6)
Note that this definition does not assume convexity of f . But
when we assume that the function f is convex, then using
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we have equivalent condition as:
(5f(x1)−5f(x2))T (x1 − x2) ≤ L ‖x1 − x2‖2 ,
∀x1, x2 ∈ X . (7)
Similarly, for the convex function f , using monotonicity of
gradient equivalence, we have following condition:
(5f(x1)−5f(x2))T (x1 − x2) ≥ 0, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X . (8)
Now, let us consider the function
g(x) =
L
2
xTx− f(x) (9)
Using (7) and (8), we first establish that g is convex. We apply
x1 and x2 to g, take the derivative, and subtract the two result
to get:
5g(x1)−5g(x2) = Lx1 −5f(x1)− Lx2 +5f(x2)
5g(x1)−5g(x2) = (Lx1 − Lx2 − (5f(x1)−5f(x2)))
(5g(x1)−5g(x2))T (x1 − x2)
= (L(x1 − x2)− (5f(x1)−5f(x2)))T (x1 − x2)
= L ‖x1 − x2‖2)− (5f(x1)−5f(x2))T (x1 − x2)
≥ 0
(10)
This is equivalent to the convex form of (8), and hence g is
convex. Now, when we expand g according to the standard
definition of convexity, we get:
f(αx1 + (1− α)x2)−(αf(x1) + (1− α)f(x2))
≤ α(1− α)L
2
‖x1 − x2‖2
(11)
where the LHS of (11) is the minimization of mixup loss and
we finished the proof.
Note that only the constant L on the right-hand side is
subject to change during optimization for a given pair of data
x1 and x2. As such, this proposition implies that minimizing
mixup loss controls the constant L which can be considered
as the Lipschitz constant of the gradient function of the neural
network, thereby making the function smoother. Establishing
this theoretically-substantiated connection between mixup and
Lipschitz regularization is the first contribution of this work.
B. Bounding the Lipschitz constant of the neural function by
adversarial Lipschitz regularization
As illustrated in Fig. 2 when regularizing the neural function
to interpolate linearly with mixup provides the smoothest
possible function among possible choices, it does not constrain
the steepness of the slope of the linear function. Therefore,
in this section, we propose to augment mixup strategy with
an explicit Lipschitz regularization to bound the Lipschitz
constant of the neural function itself. In specific, we consider
penalizing the violation of Lipschitz constraint as:
LLP =
(dY (f(x1), f(x2))
dX(x1, x2)
− γ) (12)
where dX and dY are the metric for input and output space,
respectively. Note that we put γ = 0 because, unlike the GAN
setup, we are not required to obtain 1-Lipschitz function, as
shown in Eq. (5).
The direct implementation of Eq.(12) is not trivial, partly
due to the sampling strategy of the training pairs of x1 and
x2. We follow the adversarial Lipschitz regularization strategy
presented in [16] that penalizes Eq.(12) on a pair of data points
that maximizes the Lipschitz ratio. In specific, we first select
the data point x2 to be in the vicinity of the training point x1
such that x2 = x1 + r:
‖f‖K = sup
x1,x1+r∈X ;x1 6=x2
dY (f(x1), f(x1 + r))
dX(x1, x1 + r)
(13)
where the mapping f is K-Lipschitz if taking maximum over
r results in value K or smaller. Toward this, we define r
by finding the adversarial perturbation that maximizes the
Lipschitz ratio for the given x1 as:
radv = arg max
x1,x1+r∈X ;x1 6=x2
dY (f(x1), f(x1 + r))
dX(x1, x1 + r)
(14)
and penalize the corresponding maximum violation of the
Lipschitz constraint as:
LALP =
(dY (f(x1), f(x1 + radv))
dX(x1, x1 + radv)
− γ) (15)
Since computing adversarial perturbation is a nonlinear op-
timization problem, we followed a crude and cheap power
iteration based approximation approach similar to works in [4],
[16]. In this iterative scheme, we approximate the direction at
x1 that induces the largest change in the output in terms of
divergence dY .
5Combining the mixup loss of Eq. (1) and ALR of Eq. (15),
we obtain our proposed loss function:
L = Lmixup + ζ · LALP (16)
where ζ controls the relative strength of explicit Lipschitz
regularization.
C. Integrating mixup and explicit Lipschitz regularization for
SSL
In this section, we apply the presented combination of loss
(Eq. 16) for SSL setup. Toward this, we consider a data set
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} among which only the m points are
annotated with labels {y1, ..., ym} ∈ L, and the remaining
points are unlabeled. We aim to learn parameters θ for the
mapping function f : X → Y , approximated via a deep
network.
Similar to MixMatch algorithm [18], along the course of
training, we first guess and continuously update the labels
for unlabeled data points. We augment P separate copies
of unlabeled data batch ub, and compute the average of the
model’s prediction as:
qb =
1
P
P∑
p=1
f(ub,p; θ) (17)
Note that the label guessing in this manner also regularize
the model toward consistency in a similar fashion to typical
perturbation-based approaches, as the data transformations
(e.g., rotation, translation, etc.) are assumed to leave class
semantics unaffected.
While generating a guessed label, we sharpen the obtained
labels to minimize the entropy in our estimation. Entropy
minimization is a traditional and successful strategy in the SSL
to enforce the classifier output to have low-entropy predictions
on unlabeled data [4], [7]. For the sharpening function, we use
the following operation:
Sharpen(qb, τ)i := q
1
τ
bi
/
S∑
j=1
q
1
τ
bj
(18)
where S represents the number of classes in the output space,
and τ is the temperature hyperparameter for the categorical
distribution. However, note that such sharpening is not feasible
in a multi-label classification scenario [10].
We then use this sharpened guessed labels for unlabeled
data points, and ground truth labels for labeled data points to
train the network using mixup strategy. In each batch, we mix
both labeled and unlabeled data points together to ensure that
the mixed data fairly represent the distribution of both labeled
and unlabeled data.
λ ∼ Beta(α, α)
λ′ = max(λ, 1− λ)
x˜ = λ′x1 + (1− λ′)x1
y˜ = λ′y2 + (1− λ′)y2
(19)
It is reasonable to expect that the actual labels in labeled
data are more reliable than guessed labels for unlabeled data,
which motivates us to use different loss functions for labeled
and unlabeled data points. Since we mixed them together, we
use λ′ = max(λ, 1− λ) in Eq.(19) to ensure x˜ is closer to x1
than x2: this knowledge then allow us to apply labeled and
unlabeled loss according to the index of x1. For data points in
a batch B that are closer to labeled data, we apply following
supervised loss term:
LX =
∑
B
`(f(x˜), y˜) (20)
For data points in B that are closer to unlabeled data, we apply
L2 loss as it is considered to be less sensitive to incorrect
predictions:
LU =
∑
B
‖f(x˜)− y˜‖22 (21)
Finally, we combined ALP loss as defined in Eq. (15) with
the mixup-based loss terms of Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) as:
L = LX + λ · LU︸ ︷︷ ︸
mixup loss
+ ζ · LALP︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lipschitz regularization
(22)
where λU is the weight term for the unsupervised loss, and
ζ is the weight term for the explicit Lipschitz regularization
presented in IV-B. We refer to the model trained in this manner
as Mixup-LR throughout the rest of the manuscript for brevity.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We test the effectiveness of the presented Mixup-LR on
three standard SSL benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10 [20],
SVHN [21] and CIFAR-100 [20]) and a real-world biomedical
dataset (Skin Lesion images [22], [23]). We also consider
the robustness of the presented Mixup-LR against adversarial
attacks (section V-C).
A. Implementation details
In all standard SSL benchmark experiments, we use the
Wide ResNet-28 model from [29], and for the biomedical
dataset, we use the AlexNet model from [10]. Our implemen-
tation of the model and training procedure closely matches that
of [7]. For benchmark data sets, we follow modern standards in
SSL and report the median error rate of the last 20 checkpoints
on all the unlabeled data points, and on the biomedical dataset,
we follow the classic approach and report the result on test data
by choosing the checkpoint with the lowest validation error.
In all experiments, we linearly ramp up λ to its maximum
value over the training steps. We set ζ hyperparameter to 2
in all the cases, and consider only 1 iteration to calculate
adversarial perturbation radv . Given the diversity of data sets
considered, we leave other specific implementation details to
each subsection.
For comparison, we consider three existing SSL methods
from [7]: Π-Model [3], [24], Virtual Adversarial Training
[4], and MixMatch [7]. The first two methods represent SSL
considering local smoothness, and MixMatch represents SSL
with global smoothness via a mixup strategy. Since MixMatch
inspires the presented Mixup-LR, we re-implemented Mix-
Match in the same codebase to ensure a fair comparison.
Furthermore, we trained each model on five random seeds and
reported the mean and standard deviation of the error rates.
6Methods/Labels 250 1000 4000
Π-Model [7] 53.02 ± 2.05 31.53 ± 0.09 17.41 ± 0.37
VAT [7] 36.03 ± 2.82 18.68 ± 0.40 11.05 ± 0.31
MixMatch [7] 11.08 ± 0.87 7.75 ± 0.32 6.24 ± 0.06
MixMatch (ours) 12.90 ± 2.10 8.73 ± 0.29 6.29 ± 0.11
Mixup-LR 9.47 ± 0.99 7.59 ± 1.64 5.44 ± 0.06
TABLE I: Error rate (%) comparison of Mixup-LR to baseline
methods on CIFAR10 for a varying number of labels.
Methods/Labels 250 1000 4000
Π-Model [7] 17.65 ± 0.27 8.60 ± 0.18 5.57 ± 0.14
VAT [7] 8.41 ± 1.01 5.98 ± 0.21 4.20 ± 0.15
MixMatch [7] 3.78 ± 0.26 3.27 ± 0.31 2.89 ± 0.06
MixMatch (ours) 3.65 ± 0.25 3.26 ± 0.13 2.87 ± 0.05
Mixup-LR 3.58 ± 0.30 3.09 ± 0.13 2.81 ± 0.04
TABLE II: Error rate (%) comparison of Mixup-LR to baseline
methods on SVHN for a varying number of labels.
B. Generalization performance of SSL
1) CIFAR-10: CIFAR-10 is the standard SSL benchmark
datasets with 60000 data points divided uniformly across ten
labels. We evaluate the accuracy of each method considered
with a varying number of labeled examples (250, 1000, and
4000) on all the unlabeled data sets. This means for the case
of a labeled number of 250, we report the performance on
the rest of the 59750 unlabeled samples. The λ value was
set to 75. We present the results on Table I. As compared
with the perturbation-based approach (Π-Model and VAT), the
mixup strategy (via MixMatch) achieves better generalization
throughout all the cases. By augmenting the mixup strategy
with explicit Lipschitz regularization, the presented Mixup-
LR further improves the generalization performance (p < 0.02
for l = 250 and l = 4000, unpaired t-test). For instance, for
the case of labeled number of 250, the presented Mixup-LR
reduces the mean error rate by nearly 25%.
2) SVHN: SVHN consists of 73257 samples divided across
ten labels. Similar to CIFAR-10, we evaluate the accuracy
of each method considered with varying numbers of labeled
examples (250, 1000, and 4000). The λ value was set to
250. The obtained results are presented in Table II. Similar to
CIFAR-10, the presented Mixup-LR achieves better general-
ization across all the labeled training setup compared to both
the perturbation-based approaches (Π-Model and VAT) and
mixup-based approach (MixMatch, p = 0.04 for l = 4000,
p ≈ 0.20 for l = 250 and l = 1000, unpaired t-test).
3) CIFAR-100: CIFAR-100 is similar to CIFAR-10 except
that it has 100 classes containing 600 images each. The λ value
was set to 250. Note that due to the increased complexity of
the dataset, some prior works [7] have suggested the use of a
larger model (26 million parameter) instead of the base model
considered in this work (1.5 million parameter). As such,
the presented results might confound with results previously
reported in the literature. Thus, we have only considered the
evaluation of the baseline MixMatch and presented Mixup-
LR on two different numbers of labeled examples (10000 and
15000). As shown in Table III, the presented Mixup-LR signif-
icantly improved the performance compared to MixMatch in
both cases (p < 0.0001, unpaired t-test)): the mean error rate
for MixMatch was reduced by around 9% with the presented
Methods/Labels 10000 15000
MixMatch 31.67 ± 0.30 28.50 ± 0.11
Mixup-LR 29.11 ± 0.10 26.21 ± 0.15
TABLE III: Error rate (%) comparison of Mixup-LR to Mix-
Match on CIFAR100 for a varying number of labels.
Methods/Labels 600 1200
Supervised baseline 0.80 ± 1.70 0.85 ± 1.06
MixMatch 0.88 ± 1.21 0.89 ± 0.47
Mixup-LR 0.89 ± 0.73 0.90 ± 0.66
TABLE IV: AUROC comparison of Mixup-LR to MixMatch
on Skin Lesion dataset for a varying number of labels.
Mixup-LR.
4) Skin Lesion: ISIC 2018 skin data set comprises of 10015
dermoscopic images with labels for seven different disease
categories. To evaluate the presented method, we created
two sets of labeled training data (600 and 1200) considering
the class balance. Similar to CIFAR-100, we compared the
presented Mixup-LR against the baseline MixMatch. In this
case, the λ value was set to 50. Unlike other cases, to maintain
the standards of the dataset, we report the AUROC. Since
this biomedical dataset is relatively less considered in the
SSL literature, we also included the supervised baseline. The
obtained results are shown in Table IV, where, similar to other
datasets, the presented Mixup-ALR achieves better generaliza-
tion compared to the MixMatch approach, and the supervised
baseline. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
for the corresponding labeled number of 600 and 1200 are
respectively presented in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. In these figures,
we randomly selected the model for demonstrating the ROC
comparison among the five random seed models.
5) Ablation study: Here, we primarily study the effect
of ζ hyperparameter in the presented SSL method, using
a labeled dataset of size 250 for the CIFAR-10 data set.
The ζ hyperparameter controls the effect of the presented
regularization with the mixup-based loss, as shown in Eq. (22).
We conducted this study for four different values (0, 1, 2, and
3), as shown in Table. V. While the inclusion of the Lipschitz
penalty improves upon the baseline method (i.e., ζ=0 vs. rest),
different hyperparameter values of ζ produce a similar result
with the best case at ζ=2. We also experiment to understand
the effect of the quality of adversarial perturbation on the
presented loss. Toward this, we increase the iteration number
to 2 and for a single seed experiment, obtain the median
accuracy as 88.42 on CIFAR-10 (250 labels) compared to
90.53 ± 0.99 with doing a single iteration. This shows that the
single iteration for calculating adversarial perturbation for the
Lipsthiz penalty is reasonable enough in these SSL problems
corroborating with the previous discussion in the literature [4],
[16]. However, increasing the iteration beyond two may further
improve the performance of the presented method.
C. Robustness
The neural network vulnerability to the adversarial exam-
ples is well-known phenomena [30], [31]. We hypothesize
that compared to the mixup-based approach, our presented
7Fig. 3: ROC curves of the presented Mixup-LR compared to
alternative models for classification of dermoscopic images
into seven different disease categories when trained with 600
labels.
Fig. 4: ROC curves of the presented Mixup-LR compared to
alternative models for classification of dermoscopic images
into seven different disease categories when trained using 1200
labels.
Mixup-LR is more robust against the adversarial attacks for
two reasons. First, Mixup-LR is Lipschitz regularized using
adversarial samples, making them less insensitive to simi-
lar adversarial perturbations. Second, the Lipschitz penalty
of Mixup-LR enforces local Lipschitzness in the classifier
function. Recent works have theoretically demonstrated that
regularizing the local Lipschitzness of the classifier function
helps in achieving high clean and robust accuracy [32]. To test
this hypothesis, we consider the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [31], which constructs adversarial examples in one
single step. We consider two different pixel-wise perturbation
Ablation CIFAR-10 (250 labels)
ζ = 0 12.90 ± 2.10
ζ = 1 10.03 ± 0.63
ζ = 2 9.47 ± 0.99
ζ = 3 9.77 ± 0.58
TABLE V: Ablation study on ζ hyperparameter.
MixMatch Mixup-LR
 0.007 0.07 0.007 0.07
250 68.01 ± 10.03 75.26 ± 7.64 55.24 ± 4.79 63.67 ± 4.00
1000 53.68 ± 2.35 63.67 ± 1.48 47.72 ± 3.04 57.64 ± 3.16
4000 57.73 ± 1.80 67.55 ± 2.20 53.55 ± 6.08 61.69 ± 5.39
TABLE VI: Accuracy of unlabeled data points on white-box
FGSM adversarial examples on CIFAR-10. We compare the
presented Mixup-LR against MixMatch for two different  for
three different labeled cases.
amount (i.e., ) of 0.07 and 0.007. We evaluate this adversarial
attack on the SSL model trained with the CIFAR-10 dataset.
In Table VI, we present the performance of networks trained
with Mixup-LR compared against MixMatch. As we can see
for all the models trained with different labeled numbers (250,
1000, and 4000), Mixup-LR demonstrates better robustness
compared to MixMatch. However, note that the result of
adversarial robustness might be biased since Mixup-LR was
already better in terms of clean accuracy (as seen in Table I).
To investigate this, we evaluate the drop in performance after
an adversarial attack. We present the result in Fig. 5 where
the percentage drop of the presented Mixup-LR (solid line)
is less than the corresponding MixMatch model (dotted line).
This confirms that the presented Mixup-LR is robust compared
to the model trained with the Mixup strategy only.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
While this research presents a novel SSL model (Mixup-
LR) to improve the state-of-the-art MixMatch method on
benchmark datasets, there are certain limitations of the current
research which we discuss here.
First, the current approach to penalize the violation of
the Lipschitz constraint might be expensive as it requires
1 step of back-propagation for each power iteration step
while calculating the adversarial perturbation. Although this
extra computation is standard in Lipschitz regularization (e.g.,
Gradient Penalty [15]), there are recent works that have
demonstrated the efficacy of cheap techniques for obtaining
adversarial examples [33]. As future work, we will consider
such methods to eliminate the overhead cost of generating
adversarial examples for Lipschitz regularization.
Second, in this work, by augmenting the Lipschitz regular-
ization with a mixup-based strategy, we control the Lipschitz
constant of the deep neural network. As future work, we
want to empirically validate this proposition by estimating
the network’s Lipschitz constants. Although estimation of the
Lipschitz constant for deep networks often suffers from either
lack of accuracy or poor scalability, some of the recent works
have demonstrated the accurate performance [34]. We leave
utilizing these latest findings of the literature for the future.
8Fig. 5: Percentage drop for the presented Mixup-LR compared
to MixMatch after adversarial attack (FGSM) for two pertur-
bation amount  = 0.07 and  = 0.007.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a novel SSL method, Mixup-LR, which com-
bines a mixup-based strategy with the explicit Lipschitz regu-
larization. We first showed the effect of mixup regularization in
promoting smoothness, where the mixup approach was found
to bound only the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of the
neural function. As such, we augmented mixup with explicit
Lipschitz regularization to control the Lipschitz constant of
the function itself. The efficacy of the presented Mixup-LR
was demonstrated on three SSL benchmark data sets and one
real-world clinical data set, through improvement over state-
of-the-art MixMatch model along with other standard SSL
algorithms. We also demonstrated the robustness of Mixup-
LR against single-step adversarial attacks.
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